The Hon’ble Supreme  Court recently adjudicated on the issuance of a summoning order of the Court of  the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Ghaziabad on a complaint registered by the  Enforcement Directorate, wherein the Petitioner, Rana Ayyub1,  under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 was challenging the  territorial jurisdiction of the summoning Court.
Facts
During the pandemic, the Petitioner had  initiated crowdfunding campaigns through an online crowdfunding platform named  “Ketto” and ran three campaigns from April, 2020 to September, 2021.
			
			
				
- In connection with the same, the Mumbai Zonal  Office of the Enforcement Directorate initiated an enquiry against the  Petitioner under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (“FEMA”).
 - Thereafter FIR No. 2049 of 2021 was  registered on 7.9.2021 by one Vikas Sankritayan, claiming to be the founder of  Hindu IT Cell, with Indirapuram Police Station, Ghaziabad for alleged offences  under Sections 403, 406, 418 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with  Section 66D of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 and Section 4 of the  Black Money Act, 2015. 
 - The Petitioner further received an order  under Section 37 of the FEMA read with Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act,  1961 from the Mumbai Zonal Office of the Enforcement Directorate seeking  certain documents, in addition to the documents submitted by the Petitioner. 
 - Subsequent to submitting a detailed response  to the Mumbai Zonal Office of the Enforcement Directorate, the Delhi Zone-II  Office of the Directorate of Enforcement registered a complaint on 11.11.2021  in the Court of the Special Judge at Ghaziabad. It was stated in the said  complaint that the FIR registered on 07.09.2021 on the file of the Indirapuram  Police Station, Ghaziabad formed the basis for the complaint of the Enforcement  Directorate. 
 - The Petitioner was summoned to the Delhi  Zone-II Office and her statement under Section 50 of the PMLA was recorded on  15.12.2021. 
 - A provisional order of attachment of the bank  account of the Petitioner in HDFC Bank, Koperkhairane Branch, Navi Mumbai,  Maharashtra, was passed by the Directorate of Enforcement on 04.02.2022.  Pursuant to the order of provisional attachment, the Adjudicating Authority  issued a show cause notice dated 08.03.2022
 
Thereafter, the Court of the Special Judge,  Anti-Corruption, CBI Court No.1, Ghaziabad, passed an Order on 29.11.2022  taking cognizance of the complaint lodged by the Enforcement Directorate and  summoning the Petitioner for appearance on 13.12.2022.
			
			
				Contention of the Petitioner
- Under Section 44(1) of the PMLA, an offence  punishable under the Act, shall be triable only by the Special Court  constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed. Therefore,  the Special Court in Maharashtra alone could have taken cognizance of the  complaint. 
 - Reliance was placed on the Hon’ble Supreme  Court’s judgement in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. vs. Union of India  & Ors.2 wherein it was held that the trial of the offence of money-laundering should  proceed before the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence  of money-laundering has been committed and that in case the scheduled offence  is triable by the Special Court under a special enactment elsewhere, both the  trials need to proceed independently, but in the area where the offence of money-laundering has been committed.
 - No part of the alleged offence of  money-laundering was committed within the jurisdiction of the Special Court, Ghaziabad.
 - The Petitioner’s bank account where the alleged proceeds of crime were deposited is located in Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra.
 - The proceedings for the provisional attachment of the bank account were initiated in New Delhi.
 - Therefore, the Court of the Special Judge, ought to have returned the complaint to the Enforcement Directorate, in terms of Section 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
 
			
			
				Contention of the Respondent
- The Solicitor General on behalf of the Enforcement  Directorate contended that under the scheme of the Act, the complaint of  money-laundering should follow the complaint in respect of the scheduled  offence and since the complaint in respect of the scheduled offence was  registered on 07.09.2021 in Indirapuram Police Station, Ghaziabad, the  Respondent necessarily had to register the complaint on the file  of the same Court, within whose jurisdiction the scheduled offence became  triable.  
   - The Petitioner was alleged to have received  money through an online crowdfunding platform and that there were several  victims within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of the Special Judge  who had contributed money and therefore a part of the cause of action had  actually arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court of the Special Judge, Ghaziabad.
 
			
			
				Held
As  far as which Court has jurisdiction, the same has been answered with Section 44(1)(c)  of the PMLA which states that if the Court which has taken cognizance of the  scheduled offence is different from the Special Court which has taken  cognizance of the offence of money-laundering, then the authority authorised to  file a complaint under the PMLA should make an application to the Court which  has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence. On the application so filed, the  Court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence, should commit the  case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special Court which has taken  cognizance of the complaint of money-laundering. Thus, the trial of the  scheduled offence with respect to the territorial jurisdiction, should follow  the trial of the offence of money-laundering and not vice versa. However, the  trial of both sets of offences by the same Court shall not be construed as  joint trial.
With  respect to which area the offence has been committed, it can be derived from Section 3 of the PMLA  which states that office of money-laundering can be the area in which the place  of acquisition of the proceeds of crime is located or the place of keeping it  in possession is located or the place in which it is concealed is located or  the place in which it is used is located, will be the area in which the offence  has been committed. Moreover, the definition of the words “proceeds of crime”  focuses on “deriving or obtaining a property” as a result of a criminal  activity relating to a scheduled offence. Therefore, the area in which the  property is derived or obtained or even held or concealed, will be the area in  which the offence of money-laundering is committed.
			
			
				Conclusion
The  Hon’ble Supreme Court while decoding the PMLA with respect to the jurisdiction  of the offences observed that although the bank account of the Petitioner in  Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra was attached as proceeds of crime, in accordance with  Section 5 of the PMLA, it was only the final destination to which all funds  reached. It is a place where only one of the six different processes or  activities listed in Section 3 of the PMLA has been carried out. What the  Hon’ble Supreme Court had to look at while going through the facts of this case  was where the alleged proceeds of crime were (i) concealed; or (ii) possessed;  or (iii) acquired; or (iv) used. However, it observed that the activity of the  alleged acquisition of the proceeds of crime has taken place in a virtual mode  with people from different parts of the country/world transferring money  online. If acquisition has taken place in the real physical world, the  difficulty with respect to the question of jurisdiction would have been lesser.
			
			
				The  Division Bench went ahead and relied on Kaushik Chatterjee vs. State of  Haryana & Ors.3 which had held that the issue of jurisdiction of a court to try an “offence” or  “offender” as well as the issue of territorial jurisdiction, depend upon facts  established through evidence and that these questions may have to be raised  before the court trying the offence and thereafter, such court is bound to  consider the same. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court simply discussed the law on  jurisdiction and slightly touched upon the issue with respect to the  jurisdiction not necessarily being in Maharashtra. Thereafter, it refrained  from answering the question as to which foot would have jurisdiction and sent  the Petitioner back to square one by giving her liberty to raise this issue  before the Special Court who would consider the evidence as to the places where  any one or more of the processes or activities mentioned in Section 3 of the  PMLA were carried out.
			
			By - Lakshmi Raman
			
				
				 - Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 12 of 2023 
 
				 - 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929
 
				 - 2020 (10) SCC 92