Introduction
A division bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prashant vs. State of NCT Delhi¹ adjudicated a criminal Special Leave Petition arising from an Order of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court wherein the Hon’ble High Court refused to quash the FIR and proceedings against the present Appellant for offences punishable under Sections 376 (2) (n) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Complainant in the case alleged that while she was in a relationship with the Appellant, he had forced her to have sexual intercourse on multiple occasions and had threatened her brother, thus amounting to the offence of rape and criminal intimidation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court however, observing the facts of the case and the established law on consent determined that the Complainant had lodged the First Information Report (“FIR”) with mala fide intentions and that there was no case under Section 376(2)(n) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, that could be made out and therefore quashed the FIR and the proceedings accordingly. The Supreme Court based its decisions on the parameters for application of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) laid down in State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal,² the nature of consent when the Complainant and Appellant are in a consensual relationship and the facts of the case qua the delay in filing the complaint.

Facts of the Case
The Complainant and the Appellant came in contact with each other in a call centre where the Complainant was working in November, 2017. They once again met in a park in April, 2018. The Complainant further alleged that in January, 2019, the Appellant found her address and had a forceful sexual relationship with the Complainant. Thereafter she alleged that the Complainant would threaten to hurt the brother of the Complainant and would have forceful sexual relations with the Complainant. The Complainant alleged that the Appellant refused to marry the Complainant giving various excuses, he also refused to let her meet his parents.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the Complainant had gotten married to someone else in 2019 and the Appellant had gotten married in 2020. The Supreme Court further noted that the Complainant had approached the police nine months after the alleged incident.

The Complainant there after filed a complaint and an FIR for offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Complainant further recorded her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC, 1973, wherein she stated that the Appellant would take the Complainant to his own room in Chattarpur and have physical relations with her.

The Appellant approached the Hon’ble Delhi High Court seeking to quash the FIR, however the Hon’ble High Court found that the alleged sexual relations between the parties were not the outcome of a consensual relationship and that the contents of the FIR and the statement made under Section 164 CrPC, 1973, were sufficient to proceed with the trial.

Arguments of the Appellant
The Appellant argued that the FIR and MLC report did not disclose any cognizable offence.

The Appellant argued that the relationship was consensual and the FIR was filed with an ulterior motive of retribution due to personal vengeance.

The Appellant argued that the FIR and MLC report contradicted each other as the allegations in the FIR were that the rape occurred in January, 2019 however in the MLC report filed a day prior in September, 2019 the claim was that the offence took place the week prior to filing the report.

Respondents Arguments
The Additional Solicitor General appearing for the State argued that a prima facie case had been made out and both the FIR and MLC report states that the appellant and complainant had physical relationships on the false promise of marriage.

Further the ASG submitted that the Applicant had threatened to kill the brother of the Complainant and therefore due to the threats the Complainant filed the report belatedly.

Decision of the Court
On the maintainability of the Petition under Section 482 of the CrPC, 1973.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court when considering the maintainability of the petition filed by the Appellant before the Hon’ble High Court, reiterated select parameters in which the powers of section 482 of the CrPC, may be exercised for quashing an FIR ,as held in the landmark case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that quashing may be appropriate :

“102. ...
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2).

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterating the provisions of Section 376 (2) (n) and Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 held that the sub - section 2 of Section 376 is an exception to sub - section 1 and stated that “Sub-section 2, inter alia, states that whosoever commits rape repeatedly on the same woman, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that in the case at hand a bare perusal of the FIR revealed that the Appellant and the Complainant established a relationship after meeting in 2017 and met multiple times between 2017 and 2019, including parks and their respective houses. The Hon’ble Court pointed out that even though the Complainant alleged forceful sexual relations, she did not stop meeting the Applicant after the said incident. Further it was revealed that, at one point, both parties had intentions to marry each other, however the same did not materialize. The Hon’ble Court further pointed out that the Appellant and Complainant were in a consensual relationship and were educated adults.

Since the Appellant got married in 2019 and the Complainant got married in 2020, the Hon’ble Court therefore considered it a possibility that the marriage of the Appellant in 2019 is what led to the Complainant to file the complaint.

The Hon’ble Court concluded that the continuation of the prosecution was a gross abuse of the law. The Hon’ble Court held that even if the prosecution’s case was prima facie accepted, it did not conclude that any offence under 376 (2) (n) was made out. The Court therefore observed that :

The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere breakup of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court therefore held that due to the consensual relationship between the Appellant and the Complainant, the ingredients of the offences in the FIR were not made out, therefore the High Court erred in concluding that the Complainant was a victim of sexual assault over a long period of time and therefore rejection of the application by the Appellant under Section 482 CrPC, was misconceived in law.

On Consent
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case at hand reiterated the definition of consent when parties are engaged in a relationship that is purely consensual. The Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on the case of XXXX vs. State of Madhya Pradesh³,  wherein it was held that when the Complainant is in a purely consensual relationship, the Complainant is aware of the consequences of her actions, the ingredients of the offence of rape are were not made out.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the following as held in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra⁴:

“18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.”

Conclusion
The case at hand deals with a nuanced but ever recurring issue in the legal landscape and the jurisprudence of the offence of rape. The Hon’ble Supreme Court arrived at its conclusion on the basis of a careful scrutiny of the facts at hand and the mala fides in the case of the Complainant. While in the case at hand the nature of consent of the Complaint can be determined based on the facts, the question of false promise of marriage as explained in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court determined the necessary elements required to be proven in order to convict the Accused.

However, with the introduction of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the legislation has expanded the scope of offence under Section 69 of the BNS, 2023 as below :

Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, and has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation: “deceitful means” shall include the false promise of employment or promotion, inducement or marring after suppressing identity.

The above-mentioned provision acknowledges the changes in the paradigm and nature of relationships between individuals. With growing technology and acceptance of newer forms of relationships, it is essential for the Courts to not only protect the rights of Accused from mala fide cases but also at same time ensure that a victim is protected by the courts in cases where the nature of the consent is not black and white.

By - Parshva Shah