In National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis & Anr.,¹ the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside a judgment of the High Court of Karnataka, which had held that the period spent in disposing of an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A&C Act”) could not be excluded while computing limitation for filing a challenge under Section 34(3). The Court held that once jurisdiction under Section 33 is formally invoked and the application is entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal, limitation for filing a petition under Section 34 begins only from the date on which such request is disposed of, irrespective of whether the application is ultimately allowed or dismissed.

On 15.12.2009, the Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways issued a preliminary notification under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956, for acquisition of land in Bellary District, including land belonging to Respondent No. 1. By a declaration dated 14.12.2010 under Section 3D(2), the land vested in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Compensation was determined by an Award dated 05.12.2011 under Section 3G(1). The Appellant invoked arbitration under Section 3G(5), and by Award dated 16.02.2013, the Arbitrator redetermined the market value of the land. This Award was set aside by the High Court on 16.03.2019 and remitted for fresh consideration.

Pursuant to the remand, the Arbitrator passed a fresh Award on 03.02.2022 granting benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2), 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. On 08.03.2022, the Appellant filed an application under Section 33(1)(a) seeking correction of the Award, contending that the grant of additional market value and interest under the 1894 Act was legally unsustainable. On 10.03.2022, the Respondent filed an application under Section 33(4) seeking an additional award for an allegedly omitted claim. By a common order dated 04.07.2022, both applications were dismissed. A certified copy of the order was received by the Appellant on 15.09.2022.

The Appellant thereafter filed applications under Section 34 along with applications for condonation of delay. The Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bellary, condoned the delay on 05.08.2023. However, the High Court held that the Appellant’s Section 33(1)(a) application did not fall within the scope of that provision, which is confined to correction of computation, clerical or typographical errors, and was therefore not maintainable. Consequently, the High Court held that the benefit of the extended limitation under Section 34(3) was unavailable and dismissed the Section 34 applications as time-barred. Aggrieved, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The principal issue before the Court was whether limitation under Section 34(3) commences from the date of the arbitral award or from the date on which the Section 33 application is disposed of.

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court undertook a careful examination of Sections 33 and 34(3). It observed that Section 34(3) expressly provides that where a request has been made under Section 33, limitation for filing an application under Section 34 shall be reckoned from the date on which such request is disposed of. The provision does not distinguish between applications that are allowed or dismissed, nor does it restrict the benefit to applications ultimately found to be maintainable. Reading such a qualification into the provision, the Court held, would amount to importing words that the legislature had not chosen to include.

The Court further held that once Section 33 proceedings are initiated and entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal, parties cannot be compelled to simultaneously institute proceedings under Section 34 as a matter of abundant caution. Such an approach would create multiplicity of proceedings and procedural uncertainty. The Respondent’s reliance on State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co., (2007) 10 SCC 742, was distinguished since that case involved only a letter seeking review rather than a formal application invoking Section 33 jurisdiction.

The Court also noted that the issue was no longer res integra, relying upon Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3181; USS Alliance v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 778; and Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav, 2025 INSC 1021, all of which held that limitation under Section 34(3) begins from disposal of the Section 33 application and not from the date of the original award.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, restored the order condoning delay, and directed that the Section 34 applications be decided on merits. At the same time, it clarified that where Section 33 applications are found to be sham, frivolous, mala fide, or filed solely to defeat limitation, courts would be justified in imposing exemplary costs.

The significance of this ruling lies in its definitive resolution of a recurring controversy in arbitration practice. By holding that formal invocation and entertainment of Section 33 jurisdiction is sufficient to defer limitation under Section 34(3), regardless of the eventual outcome of the application, the Court has provided much-needed certainty in post-award proceedings and reinforced the coherent procedural scheme of the A&C Act.

By - Akarsh Pandey